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Abstract
This paper introduces a new class of values for level structures. The new values, called
Harsanyi support levels payoffs, extend the Harsanyi payoffs from the Harsanyi set to level
structures and contain the Shapley levels value (Winter, 1989) as a special case. We also
look at extensions of the weighted Shapley values to level structures. These values, we call
them weighted Shapley support levels values, constitute a subset of the class of Harsanyi
support levels payoffs and coincide on a level structure with only two levels with a class
of weighted coalition structure values, already mentioned in Levy and McLean (1989) and
discussed in McLean (1991). Axiomatizations of the studied classes are provided for both
exogenously and endogenously given weights.
Keywords Cooperative game · Level structure · (Weighted) Shapley (levels) value ·
Level sharing system · Harsanyi set · Dividends
1 Introduction
Many organizations, companies, governments and so on are organized in hierarchical struc-
tures. Typically, there is one unit at the top and in the following levels, each unit of the
superior level is split into two or more subordinate units, which usually have a lower rank
than the higher ones. A similar organizational structure appears in some respects in supply
chains. Effectiveness increases by sharing or pooling of physical objects, resources, and in-
formation. Queuing problems or electricity and other networks have a related background.
A central characteristic of all these forms of organization is that a cooperating unit itself
can be an actor in order to gain advantages of cooperation for the members of the unit.
The question is: how should we share the realized benefits and allocate the costs incurred.
To distribute the profits of cooperating coalitions, the application of a cooperative game
seems to be a natural approach. Winter (1989) defined a model for cooperative games
with a hierarchical structure, called level structure, which consists of a sequence of coalition
structures (the levels). In each level, the player set is partitioned into components. Winter’s
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2value (Winter, 1989) for such a model, we call it Shapley levels value, extends the Owen
value (Owen, 1977), by itself an extension of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b). Thus,
this value satisfies extensions of the symmetry axioms that are satisfied by the Owen value.
To treat symmetric players differently when there are exogenously given weights for
the players, Shapley (1953a) introduced the weighted Shapley values. Vidal-Puga (2012)
established a value for coalition structures with weights given by the size of the coalitions.
With a step by step top-down algorithm, Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011) extended it to
level structures. Besner (2019) generalized this value to the class of the weighted Shapley
hierarchy levels values for arbitrary exogenously given weights. These values satisfy an
extension of the consistency property of the weighted Shapley values in Hart and Mas-
Colell (1989) but do not satisfy the null player axiom in general.
The weighted values for coalition structures in Levy and McLean (1989) and McLean
(1991) have the opposite behavior, they satisfy the null player property but do not match a
consistency property in the above sense. In Levy and McLean (1989) are examined several
classes of weighted values for coalition structures which use the same weight system as
the weighted Shapley values: either for the players within a component or for the compo-
nents themselves if the components act as players, representing the players they contain.
The combined use of such a weight system, both for players and for components, is only
mentioned. This latter class of extensions of the weighted Shapley values and an exten-
sion of the class of random order values (Weber, 1988) in general to coalition structures
is discussed in McLean (1991). Dragan (1992) called McLean’s class of extensions of the
weighted Shapley values McLean weighted coalition structure values, presented for them a
formula related to that of the Owen value, and showed that these values coincide for a fixed
coalition structure with a multiweighted Shapley value (Dragan, 1992).
A new view on coalition functions was introduced by Harsanyi (1959). He used so-called
(Harsanyi) dividends, assigned to all feasible coalitions of a player set according to the
coalition function: the singletons receive the singleton worth as dividend and the dividend
of each larger coalition amounts to the worth of this coalition minus the sum of all dividends
of the proper sub-coalitions of this coalition. The weighted Shapley values give each player
as a payoff, according to her for all coalitions equal weight, shares in the dividends of the
coalitions in which they are contained. Compared to this, the Harsanyi payoffs, the TU-
values from the Harsanyi set (Hammer, 1977; Vasil’ev, 1978), are more flexible here. They
allow each player to receive a share of a dividend from a coalition containing him, individual
for each coalition.
In this article, we introduce the Harsanyi support levels payoffs. To the best of our
knowledge, these are the first values for level structures that extend the Harsanyi payoffs.
Each value of the new class can be represented by a formula with dividends. The coefficients
in the formulas constitute a dividend sharing system, i. e., all coefficients are non-negative
and amount to one for each coalition. Thus, by definition of a Harsanyi payoff, the values
from this class coincide with a Harsanyi payoff for a given set of players and a fixed level
structure and inherit so all properties (adapted to level structures) of these values. Since
the Harsanyi payoffs are in general no random order values, we cannot take over the proof
procedures for characterizations, e.g., in Winter (1989) or McLean (1991).
All our proofs are based on dividends, whereby two new lemmas are of significant assis-
tance. We give axiomatizations for exogenously given level sharing systems and provide
an axiomatization for the entire class of values where weights are derived endogenously
through the actual solution. In addition, we present, as a subset of the class of Harsanyi
support levels payoffs, the weighted Shapley support levels values, which coincide on a level
3structure with only two levels with the McLean weighted coalition structure values. For
this new class of values, our axiomatizations extend axiomatizations in Nowak and Radzik
(1995).
The outline of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries, Sec-
tion 3 presents the axioms and Section 4 gives a quick look at the Shapley levels value.
As the main part, we introduce in Section 5 the Harsanyi support levels payoffs with ap-
propriate axiomatizations and, in Section 6, the weighted Shapley support levels values.
Section 7 gives a conclusion and discuss the results. The Appendix (Section 8) provides all
the proofs, two related lemmas and a note to the logical independence of the axioms in our
axiomatizations.
2 Preliminaries
We denote by R the real numbers and by R++ the set of all positive real numbers. A
cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v) consisting of a finite
set N of players and a coalition function v : 2N→ R, v(∅) = 0, where 2N is the power set
of N . The subsets S ⊆ N are called coalitions, v(S) is the worth of coalition S, the set
of all nonempty subsets of S is denoted by ΩS, and the set of all TU-games with player set
N is denoted by VN. The null game 0 is defined by 0(T ) = 0 for all T ⊆ N .
Let (N, v) ∈ VN and S ⊆ N . The dividends ∆v(S) (Harsanyi, 1959) are defined
inductively by
∆v(S) :=
{
v(S)−∑R(S ∆v(R), if S ∈ ΩN, and
0, if S = ∅. (1)
A TU-game (N, uT ) ∈ VN, T ∈ ΩN, with uT (S) := 1 if T ⊆ S and uT (S) := 0 otherwise for
all S ⊆ N is called an unanimity game and T is called an unanimity coalition. It is
well-known that any coalition function v on N has a unique presentation
v =
∑
T∈ΩN
∆v(T )uT . (2)
(N, v) is called totally positive (Vasil’ev, 1975) if ∆v(T ) ≥ 0 for all T ⊆ N . The marginal
contribution MCvi (S) of player i ∈ N to S ⊆ N\{i} is given by MCvi (S) := v(S ∪ {i})−
v(S). We call a coalition S ⊆ N essential in v if ∆v(S) 6= 0. Player i ∈ N is called a
null player in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}; players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, are called
(mutually) dependent (Nowak and Radzik, 1995) in v if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) = v(S ∪ {j})
for all S ⊆ N\{i, j} or, equivalent to it as a well-known fact, if
∆v(S ∪ {k}) = 0, k ∈ {i, j}, for all S ⊆ N\{i, j}. (3)
A coalition structure B on N is a partition of the player set N , i.e., a collection
of nonempty, pairwise disjoint, and mutually exhaustive subsets of N . Each B ∈ B is
called a component and B(i) denotes the component that contains a player i ∈ N . A
level structure (Winter, 1989) on N is a finite sequence B := {B0, ...,Bh+1} of coalition
structures Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h+ 1, on N such that:
• B0 = {{i}: i ∈ N}.
• Bh+1 = {N}.
4• For each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br is a refinement of Br+1, i. e., Br(i) ⊆ Br+1(i) for all i ∈ N .
Br is called the r-th level of B; B is the set of all components B ∈ Br of all levels
Br ∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h; Br(Bk) is the component of the r-th level which contains the component
Bk ∈ Bk, 0 ≤ k ≤ r ≤ h+ 1.
The collection of all level structures with player set N is denoted by LN. A TU-game
(N, v) ∈ VN together with a level structure B ∈ LN is an LS-game (N, v,B). The set of all
LS-games on N is denoted by VLN. To make clear that a level structure B := {B0, ...,Bh+1}
has a total of h + 2 levels, we also write Bh instead of B. Note that each TU-game (N, v)
corresponds to an LS-game (N, v,B0) with a trivial level structure B0 and we would
like to say that each LS-game (N, v,B1) corresponds to a game with coalition structure
(Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974; Owen, 1977).
Let (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh. For each LS-game, we can also have a look at associated
games where components of B act as players. We define for each level r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, the
level structure Br := {Br0, ...,Brh+1−r} ∈ LBr as the induced r-th level structure from B
by considering the components B ∈ Br as players. There, all levels below r are dropped
from the original level structure. In the k-th level Brk of Br, 0 ≤ k ≤ h + 1 − r, we have
for each component Br+k ∈ Br+k of the (r + k)-th level in the original level structure B
an associated component Br
k∈ Brk. This component Brk∈ Brk contains the components
B ∈ Br as players which are subsets of the original component Br+k ∈ Br+k so we have
Brk := {{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ Br+k} for all Br+k∈ Br+k}1.
If a coalition T ∈ ΩN, T = ⋃B⊆T,B∈BrB, is the union of components of the r-th level from
B and we want to stress this property, T is denoted by T r. Each such T r is an associated
coalition to a coalition of all players B ∈ Br, B ⊆ T r, in the induced r-th level structure,
denoted by T r := {B ∈ Br : B ⊆ T r} and vice versa. The induced r-th level game(Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr, where Br is the player set with B ∈ Br as players, is given by
vr(T r) := v(T r) for all T r∈ ΩBr.2 (4)
A TU-value φ is an operator that assigns to any (N, v) ∈ VN a payoff vector φ(N, v) ∈ RN,
an LS-value ϕ is an operator that assigns payoff vectors ϕ(N, v, B) ∈ RN to all LS-games
(N, v, B) ∈ VLN.
We define WN := {f : N → R++}, wi := w(i) for all w ∈ WN and i ∈ N , as the set of all
positive weight systems on N . For all B ∈ LN, we define WB := {f : B → R++}, wB :=
w(B) for all w ∈ WB and B ∈ B, as the set of all positive components weight systems
on B.
The collection ΛN on N of all sharing systems λ ∈ ΛN is defined by
ΛN :=
{
λ = (λT,i)T∈ΩN, i∈T
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈T
λT,i = 1 and λT,i ≥ 0 for each T ∈ ΩN and all i ∈ T
}
.
Let B ∈ LN, B = Bh, and Br+1 ∈ Br+1, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. The collection ΛBr+1 on Br+1 of all
1Loosely speaking, the components in both layer structures are related to each other from the r-th level
upwards in such a way that the same original players from the player set N are somehow the underlying
part of two associated components.
2Vaguely formulated, all the coalitions of the r-th level game and the associated coalitions of the original
game, they contain the same players of the original player set N in some way, have the same worth.
5component sharing systems λ ∈ ΛBr+1 is defined by
ΛB
r+1
:=
{
λ = (λT r,Br)T r∈ΩBr+1, T r=⋃B⊆T,B∈Br B,Br∈Br, Br⊆T r
∣∣∣ ∑
Br∈Br, Br⊆T r
λT r,Br = 1 and
λT r,Br ≥ 0 for each T r∈ ΩBr+1, T r =
⋃
B⊆T r, B∈Br
B, and all Br∈ Br, Br⊆ T r
}
.
A level sharing system λ = λB :=
{
λB|B ∈ {N} ∪ B\B0, λB ∈ ΛB} is a set system
that contains a component sharing system for each component of B ∪ {N} that is not a
singleton. The collection of all level sharing systems λ on B is denoted by ΛB.
For all (N, v) ∈ VN and w ∈ WN, the (positively) weighted Shapley value Shw
(Shapley, 1953a) is defined by
Shwi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
wi∑
j∈S wj
∆v(S) for all i ∈ N.
As a special case of a weighted Shapley value, all weights are equal, the Shapley value
Sh (Shapley, 1953b) is defined by
Shi(N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
∆v(S)
|S| for all i ∈ N.
Hammer (1977) and Vasil’ev (1978) introduced independently a set of TU-values, called
Harsanyi set, also known as selectope, which we designate by H. The payoffs are
obtained by distributing the Harsanyi dividends with the help of a sharing system. Each
TU-value Hλ∈ H, λ ∈ ΛN, titled Harsanyi payoff, is defined by
Hλi (N, v) :=
∑
S⊆N,S3i
λS,i∆v(S), for all i ∈ N.
Obviously, the weighted Shapley values are a proper subset of the Harsanyi set. The best-
known LS-value is the Shapley levels value3 (Winter, 1989). We introduce this value here
with a formula, presented in Calvo, Lasaga, and Winter (1996, Eq. (1)): Let (N, v, B) ∈
VLN, B = Bh, and for all T ∈ ΩN, T 3 i, be
KT (i) :=
h∏
r=0
KrT (i), where K
r
T (i) :=
1
|{B ∈ Br : B⊆ Br+1(i), B ∩ T 6= ∅}| .
The Shapley levels value ShL is given by
ShLi (N, v,B) :=
∑
T⊆N,T3i
KT (i)∆v(T ) for all i ∈ N.
It is easy to see that ShL coincides with Sh if B = B0.
3The value is also known as level(s) structure value or Winter’s (Shapley type) value. Our designation is
used, e. g., in A´lvarez-Mozos et al. (2017).
63 Axioms
We refer to the following axioms for LS-values ϕ which are mostly simple adaptions of
standard axioms:
Efficiency, E. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, we have ∑i∈N ϕi(N, v,B) = v(N).
Null player, N. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN and i ∈ N such that i is a null player in v, we
have ϕi(N, v,B) = 0.
Nullgame, NG. ϕi(0, v,B) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Additivity, A. For all (N, v,B), (N, v′,B) ∈ VLN, we have
ϕ(N, v,B) + ϕ(N, v′,B) = ϕ(N, v + v′,B).
Positivity, Po (Vasil’ev, 1975). For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN such that (N, v) is totally positive,
we have ϕi(N, v,B) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
Strict aggregate monotonicity, SAMo (Megiddo, 1974). For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN and
α ∈ R++, we have ϕi(N, v + α · uN ,B) > ϕi(N, v,B) for all i ∈ N .
Marginality, M (Young, 1985). For all (N, v,B), (N, v′,B) ∈ VLN and i ∈ N such that
MCvi (S) = MC
v′
i (S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}, we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N, v′,B).
Coalitional strategic equivalence, CSE (Chun, 1989). For all α ∈ R, (N, v,B) ∈ VLN,
and S ∈ ΩN, we have ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕi(N, v + α · uS,B) for all i ∈ N\S.
A dependent player behaves like a dummy player in all coalitions that do not contain all
dependent players: her marginal contribution to such coalitions is always zero. In the next
axiom for level structures, the ratio of two player’s payoffs is equal to the ratio of the
weights of the player’s singletons if both players are dependent and are members of the
same component of the first level.
w-weighted dependence, Dw0 (Nowak and Radzik, 1995). For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, B =
Bh, w ∈ WB, i, j ∈ N such that j ∈ B1(i), and i, j are dependent in v, we have
ϕi(N, v,B)
w{i}
=
ϕj(N, v,B)
w{j}
.
Mutual dependence, MD0 (Nowak and Radzik, 1995). For all (N, v,B), (N, v′,B) ∈
VLN, i, j ∈ N such that j ∈ B1(i), and i, j are dependent in v and v′, we have
ϕi(N, v,B)ϕj(N, v′,B) = ϕj(N, v,B)ϕi(N, v′,B).
This axiom states that the ratios of two player’s payoffs in two different games are equal
if both players are members of the same component of the first level and both players are
dependent in both games if no payoff is zero. The following axiom weakens Dw0 .
Coalitional differential λ-dependence, CDDλ0 . For all α ∈ R, (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, λ ∈
ΛB, S ∈ ΩN, S = S0, i, j ∈ S such that j ∈ B1(i), and i, j are dependent in v, we have
λS,{j}
[
ϕi(N, v + α · uS,B)− ϕi(N, v,B)
]
= λS,{i}
[
ϕj(N, v + α · uS,B)− ϕj(N, v,B)
]
.
Our new axiom means that if all players of a coalition S change their cooperation and take
this change with them into all supersets of S, the ratio of the payoff differences of two
dependent players from S who are in the same component of the first level is equal to the
7ratio of their sharing weights for coalition S (if we have no null-weights). The next axiom
is typical for LS-values and plays an important role in our examinations. It claims that
the sum of all players’ payoffs of a component coincides with this component’s payoff in an
induced level game where the component is regarded as a player.
Level game property, LG (Winter, 1989). For all (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, B ∈
Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, we have ∑
i∈B
ϕi(N, v,B) = ϕB(Br, vr,Br). (5)
Winter (1989) used the following axiom to characterize the Shapley levels value: the sum of
the payoffs to all players of a component is equal to the sum of the payoffs to all players of
another component of the same level if both components are subsets of the same component
of the next higher level and both components are symmetric players in the r-th level game.
Symmetry between components, Sym4 (Winter, 1989). For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN,B =
Bh, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk) and Bk, B` are symmetric in
(Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr, we have ∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B).
This axiom contains, so to speak, an adaptation of the well-known symmetry axiom to
LS-values in combination with the level game property. Similarly, we extend all previously
introduced axioms, marked by an index zero, into new axioms which use, so to speak, the
level game property for their purposes. We could also have done without the previously
introduced axioms, but we think that the statement of the individual axioms is easier to
follow and that the somewhat inherent level game property becomes clearer. This also
makes the message of the axiomatizations in the main part more understandable, whereby
each of the following axioms can conceptually be replaced by the associated axiom with
subscript 0 and the level game property. For this reason, we do not explain the following
axioms in more detail.
Remark 3.1. Each of the following axioms coincides with the associated axiom, marked
by an index 0, if h = 0, and is implied, along with LG, by the associated axiom.
w-weighted dependence between components, Dw. For all (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, B =
Bh, w ∈ WB, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), and Bk, B` are dependent
in (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBk
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)
wB`
.
Mutual dependence between components, MD. For all (N, v,B), (N, v′,B) ∈
VLN,B = Bh, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), and Bk, B` are dependent
in (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr and (Br, v′r,Br) ∈ VLBr, we have∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v
′,B) =
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)
∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v
′,B).
4This axiom is called coalitional symmetry in Winter (1989).
8Coalitional differential λ-dependence between components, CDDλ. For all
α ∈ R, (N, v,B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, λ ∈ ΛB, S ∈ ΩN, Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, such that
B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), Bk, B` ∩ S 6= ∅, and Bk, B` are dependent in (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr and
CrS :=
⋃
B∈Br:B⊆Br+1(Bk), B∩S 6=∅B, we have
λCrS , B`
∑
i∈Bk
[
ϕi(N, v+α ·uS,B)−ϕi(N, v,B)
]
= λCrS , Bk
∑
i∈B`
[
ϕi(N, v+α ·uS,B)−ϕi(N, v,B)
]
.
(6)
Finally, we present an axiom for TU-values φ that coincides with CDDλ when we have a
level structure B = B0.
Coalitional differential λ-dependence between players, CDDPλ. For all α ∈ R,
(N, v) ∈ VN, λ ∈ ΛN, S ∈ ΩN, i, j ∈ S such that i, j are dependent in v, we have
λS,j
[
φi(N, v + α · uS, )− φi(N, v)
]
= λS,i
[
φj(N, v + α · uS)− φj(N, v)
]
.
4 The Shapley levels value
Winter (1989) used the Owen value (Owen, 1977) as a starting point for his LS-value.
Therefore, Winter has extended the efficiency, null player, symmetry and additivity axioms
to axioms for level structures where symmetry splits into symmetry between components
and an individual symmetry axiom. If we define a level structure as above, i. e., the single-
tons are the elements of the lowest level, Winter (1989, remark 1.6) pointed out that we can
omit the individual symmetry axiom. In this sense, we present Winter’s first axiomatization
of the Shapley levels value5.
Theorem 4.1. (Winter, 1989) ShL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, N, Sym, and
A.
It should be noted that there exist some further axiomatizations of the Shapley levels value
(see Calvo, Lasaga and Winter 1996; Khmelnitskaya and Yanovskaya 2007; Casajus 2010;
Besner, 2019).
5 Harsanyi support levels payoffs
If there are convincing reasons, not contained in the coalition function itself, to treat sym-
metric players differently, then symmetric players (acting components) should also not get
the same payoff, as it is the case by the Shapley levels value. We can have fixed metrics
for each player assigned to the players for all the coalitions containing them. For example,
sometimes a player’s influence on other partners is stronger when another player is not on
the team. Or a player can only really exert his influence if specific other players have joined
the coalition to support him. The following value gives the possibility to deal with such
situations.
First, we assume that a level sharing system is exogenously given. Let (N, v,B) ∈ VLN,
B = Bh, and λ ∈ ΛB. By (2), v can be expressed as a linear combination of unanimity
games. For each unanimity game (with a multiplicative factor in the form of the unanimity
5Winter (1989) introduced his value axiomatically and used this axiomatization as a definition.
9coalition dividend), we can describe the payoff of our LS-value as follows. Each h-th level
component that contains at least one player from the unanimity coalition receives a share
of the unanimity coalition dividend proportional to its sharing weight for the coalition that
contains all such h-th level components. Then the share of each h-th level component
involved is distributed among all their (h− 1)-th level subcomponents that contain at least
one unanimity coalition player, proportional to their sharing weights from the coalition
that contains all these subcomponents, and so on. In the end, each player of the unanimity
coalition gets her share, “supported” by the sharing weights of all her supercomponents and
these payoffs will be added up over all unanimity games in which she is not a null player.
Definition 5.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, λ ∈ ΛB, and for all T r ∈ ΩN, T r =⋃
B⊆T r, B∈BrB, 0 ≤ r ≤ ` ≤ h, i ∈ T r, be
Kλ,T r(i) :=
h∏
`=r
λC`Tr (i),B`(i), where (7)
C`T r(i) :=
⋃
B∈B :`B⊆B`+1(i),
B∩T r 6=∅
B. (8)
The Harsanyi support levels payoff HλSL is given by
HwSLBr(i)(Br, vr,Br) :=
∑
T r∈ΩBr, T r3Br(i)
Kλ,T r(i)∆vr(T r) for all i ∈ N, (9)
where T r∈ ΩN is the associated coalition to T r and HwSLi (N, v, B) = HwSL{i} (B0, v0,B0). The
class of all Harsanyi support levels payoffs is called Harsanyi support levels set and is
denoted by HSL.
Remark 5.2. We see that the Shapley levels value is a Harsanyi support levels payoff where
all components of the same level have the same sharing weights for each coalition to which
they belong and add up to one.
Remark 5.3. For each (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, λ ∈ ΛB, and for all T = T 0 ∈ ΩN, T 3 i, we have∑
i∈T Kλ,T (i) = 1 and Kλ,T (i) ≥ 0. Therefore, for fixed N and B ∈ LN, each HλSL∈ HSL
on (N, v, B) coincides with a Hλ′ ∈ H, λ′ ∈ ΛN, on (N, v) ∈ VN where λ′T,i = Kλ,T (i) for
each T ∈ ΩN and all i ∈ T and the level structure is disregarded.
The Harsanyi support levels payoffs match a number of axioms, especially those used in
our axiomatizations below.
Proposition 5.4. Let B ∈ LN, B = Bh, and λ ∈ ΛB. HλSL satisfies E, N, NG, A, P, M,
CDDλ, and LG.
We present a first axiomatization that replaces the symmetry property in Theorem 4.1 by
the coalitional differential λ-dependence property.
Theorem 5.5. Let B ∈ LN, B = Bh, and λ ∈ ΛB. HλSL is the unique LS-value that satisfies
E, N, CDDλ, and A.
As the proof shows, in the axiomatization with CDDλ, the requirement that two compo-
nents must be dependent can be omitted. However, then the axiom is no more weaker than
the corresponding Dw.
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Remark 5.6. If we use the coinciding axioms for TU-values, we have a new axiomatization
of the Harsanyi payoffs with exogenously given sharing systems.
The Harsanyi support levels payoffs have an exceptional status among extensions of
Harsanyi payoffs to LS-values.
Theorem 5.7. An LS-value ϕ coincides for fixed N and B ∈ LN with a Harsanyi payoff
and satisfies LG if and only if ϕ ∈ HSL.
We get an extension of probably the most famous characterization of the Harsanyi set
(Vasil’ev, 1981; Derks, Haller, and Peters, 2000) to LS-games.
Corollary 5.8. An LS-value ϕ satisfies E, N, Po, A, and LG if and only if ϕ ∈ HSL.
6 Weighted Shapley support levels values
For applications, the class of weighted Shapley values is an important subset of the Harsanyi
set. Therefore, we would like to highlight the following subset of the Harsanyi support levels
set that extends the class of weighted Shapley values for level structures.
Definition 6.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, w ∈ WB, and for all T r ∈ ΩN, T r =⋃
B⊆T r, B∈BrB, 0 ≤ r ≤ ` ≤ h, i ∈ T r, be
Kw,T r(i) :=
h∏
`=r
K`w,T r(i), where K
`
w,T r(i) :=
wB`(i)∑
B∈B`:B⊆B`+1(i),
B∩T r 6=∅
wB
.
The weighted Shapley support levels value ShwSL is given by
ShwSLBr(i)(Br, vr,Br) :=
∑
T r∈ΩBr, T r3Br(i)
Kw,T r(i)∆vr(T r) for all i ∈ N, (10)
where T r ∈ ΩN is the associated coalition to T r and ShwSLi (N, v, B) = ShwSL{i} (B0, v0,B0).
The class of all weighted Shapley support levels values is denoted by WSSL.
Remark 6.2. For a level structure B = Bh, a weighted Shapley levels value ShwSL coincides
with a Harsanyi support levels payoff HλSL where for each T r ∈ ΩN, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, we have
λCTr, B = wB for all B ∈ Br. ShwSL coincides with Shw if B = B0 and, if B = B1, the
Kw,T 0(i) coincide with the “λ
S
i ” given in Dragan (1992, Sec. 2(e)). Therefore, in this case,
the ShwSL coincide with the McLean weighted coalition structure values (Dragan, 1992; Levy
and McLean, 1989; McLean, 1991).
Also the weighted Shapley support levels values match a number of axioms.
Proposition 6.3. Let w ∈ WB. ShwSL satisfies, beside the axioms presented in Proposition
5.4,6 SAMo, Dw, and MD.
The following two theorems are extensions of two characterizations of the weighted Shapley
values with exogenously given weights in Nowak and Radzik (1995). The proof from our first
theorem shows that additivity can replace the linearity axiom in their first axiomatization.
6For CDDλ, we have to use a λ as stated in Remark 6.2.
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Theorem 6.4. Let w ∈ WB. ShwSL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, N, Dw, and
A.
Theorem 6.5. Let w ∈ WB. ShwSL is the unique LS-value that satisfies E, Dw, and M.
Our last theorem axiomatizes the class of weighted Shapley support levels values in general
and is closely related to an axiomatization of the weighted Shapley values in Nowak and
Radzik (1995, Theorem 2.4, Remark 2.3).
Theorem 6.6. An LS-value ϕ satisfies E, N, SAMo, A, and MD if and only if ϕ ∈
WSSL.
7 Conclusion and discussion
The rapidly increasing volume of collected data and global networking make it possible
and necessary to share benefits between cooperating actors, often hierarchically structured.
According to the above examinations, for the distribution of the generated surpluses, the
presented new classes of LS-values provide an alternative to the Shapley levels value and
the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values. A close examination of the Shapley levels
value definition given here shows that in unanimity games it is not advantageous for the
individual player to merge into components: each component has only the same weight as
a single player.
This is generally not the case for the classes of LS-values presented here and the weighted
Shapley hierarchy levels values: the greater the weight of a component, the higher the share
of an unanimity coalition player on the unanimity coalition dividend. By the weighted
Shapley hierarchy levels values, players who do not belong to the unanimity coalition also
receive a share of the unanimity dividend if they contribute to the weight of the components
involved.
On the contrary, the values of our new classes always leave null players without benefits.
However, here again, it is a great competitive advantage for the players to join forces.
First of all, of course, for those who form a cooperating subgroup within an unanimity
coalition. And then for all players who belong to coalitions with positive dividends within
the whole coalition function. Here, the players of a component always “support” each
other in changing unanimity games, even if they do not belong to the unanimity coalition.
Nevertheless, the dummy players or null players do not receive assistance, although they
can contribute to the total weight of the component.
A disadvantage of the new value classes can be seen in the fact that it is usually not
clear what the new component weights are when a player leaves the game. As a result, all
our axiomatizations, unlike the axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley hierarchy levels in
Besner (2019), require a fixed set of players.
8 Appendix
8.1 Additional lemmas, used in the proofs
The following lemma states that each non-empty coalition S for each level is a subset of
only one coalition that is a union of components from this level which have a non-empty
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intersection with S.
Lemma 8.1. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, Br ∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. Each S ∈ ΩN is a subset
of exactly one coalition T r∈ ΩN, T r= ⋃B⊆T r, B∈Br,
B∩S 6=∅
B. Thus, we can also uniquely designate
each S ∈ ΩN as ST r .
Proof. Each coalition T r∈ ΩN is a union of components B ∈ Br. Br is a partition, and so
each player i ∈ S, S ∈ ΩN, is contained in only one component B ∈ Br. Therefore, for each
coalition S ∈ ΩN there is exactly one coalition T r∈ ΩN which is a union of all components
B ∈ Br containing at least one player i ∈ S.
The next lemma shows that for each coalition T in an induced level structure the dividend
in the induced level game is equal to the sum of the dividends in the original game from
all coalitions S of the original level structure which are subsets of a coalition T associated
to T and have the property of the previous lemma with respect to coalition T .
Lemma 8.2. Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, Br ∈ B, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, and ST r be the coalitions
from lemma 8.1 with associated coalitions T r. Then we have in the r-th level game (Br, vr,Br)
for each T r∈ ΩBr, associated to T r∈ ΩN,
∆vr(T r) =
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r). (11)
Proof. Let t = |{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ T r}| the number of components B ∈ Br which are
subsets from a coalition T r ∈ ΩN with associated T r ∈ ΩBr. We use induction on the size
t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |Br|.
Initialization: Let t = 1. T r is a component B ∈ Br and T r is a player in vr. We have
∆vr(T r) =
(1)
vr(T r) =
(4)
v(T r) =
(1)
∑
S⊆T r
∆v(S) =
Lem.
8.1
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r).
Induction step: Assume that (11) holds for an arbitrary tˆ ≥ 1 (IH). Let now Tˆ r ∈ ΩBr
with associated Tˆ r ∈ ΩN, tˆ = |{B ∈ Br : B ⊆ Tˆ r}| and T r = Tˆ r ∪ Bˆ, Bˆ ∈ Br, Bˆ 6⊆ Tˆ r. We
have t = tˆ+ 1 and it follows
∆vr(T r) =
(1)
∑
Qr⊆T r
∆vr(Qr) =
(1)
(4)
v(T r)−
∑
Qr(T r
∆vr(Qr)
=
(1)
(IH)
∆v(T
r) +
∑
S(T r
∆v(S)−
∑
Qr(T r,
Qr⊆Br
∑
SQr⊆Qr
∆v(SQr)
=
Lem.
8.1
∆v(T
r) +
∑
S(T r
∆v(S)−
∑
S(T r,
S 6=STr
∆v(S)
= ∆v(T
r) +
∑
STr(T r
∆v(ST r) =
∑
STr⊆T r
∆v(ST r).
8.2 Proofs
Convention 8.3. In order to avoid cumbersome case distinctions in the proofs with CDDλ
or Dw, if we consider only one single component isolated as a player, we define the compo-
nent dependent on itself. Then CDDλ or Dw is trivially satisfied.
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8.2.1 Proof of Proposition 5.4
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, λ ∈ ΛB, and Kλ,T r be the expressions according to Def. 5.1.
• E, N, NG, A, P, M: It is well-known that all Hλ′ ∈ H, λ′ ∈ ΛN, satisfy the mentioned
axioms. Thus, the claim follows by Remark 5.3.
• LG: Let Br∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h. If r = 0, (5) trivially is satisfied.
Let now 1 ≤ r ≤ h. Obviously, by (8), we have for all S0 ⊆ N, S0 ∩Br 6= ∅,
∑
j∈Br, j∈S0
r−1∏
`=0
λC`
S0
(j),B`(j) = 1. (12)
Let i ∈ Br be fixed and ST r ∈ ΩN the coalitions from Lemma 8.1 with related coalitions
T r. Note, if i ∈ ST r , we have Br⊆ T r. For all S0T r := ST r , S0T r 3 i, r ≤ ` ≤ h, we have
λC`
S0
Tr
(i),B`(i) =
Lem.
8.1
λC`Tr (i),B`(i). (13)
It applies, B`(i) = B`(j) for all j ∈ Br and r ≤ ` ≤ h. For all S0T r 3 i, it follows,
∑
j∈Br,
j∈S0Tr
Kλ,S0Tr (j) =(7)
∑
j∈Br,
j∈S0Tr
h∏
`=0
λC`
S0
Tr
(j),B`(j) =
(13)
∑
j∈Br,
j∈S0Tr
r−1∏
`=0
λC`
S0
Tr
(j),B`(j)
h∏
`=r
λC`Tr (i),B`(i)
=
(12)
h∏
`=r
λC`Tr (i),B`(i) =(7)
Kλ,T r(i). (14)
We have ∆v0(S0) = ∆v(S0) for all S0 ∈ ΩN and associated S0 ∈ ΩB0. Finally, we get the
following:∑
j∈Br
HλSLj (N, v,B) =
(9)
∑
j∈Br
∑
S0⊆N,
S03j
Kλ,S0(j)∆v(S
0) =
Lem.
8.1
∑
j∈Br
∑
S0Tr⊆N,
S0Tr3j
Kλ,S0Tr (j)∆v(S
0
T r)
=
∑
S0Tr⊆N
∑
j∈Br,
j∈S0Tr
Kλ,S0Tr (j)∆v(S
0
T r) =
(14)
∑
S0Tr⊆N,T r3Br
Kλ,T r(i)∆v(S
0
T r)
=
Lem.
8.1
∑
T r⊆Br, T r3Br
Kλ,T r(i)
∑
S0Tr⊆T r
∆v(S
0
T r)
=
Lem.
8.2
∑
T r⊆Br, T r3Br
Kλ,T r(i)∆vr(T r) =
(9)
ShλSLBr (Br, vr,Br).
• CDDλ: Let α ∈ R, S ∈ ΩN, k, ` ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k), Br(k),Br(`)∩S 6= ∅,
and Br(k),Br(`) be dependent in vr for the LS-game (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr. If λCrS , Bk = 0 or
λCrS , B` = 0, (6) is satisfied by (9). Otherwise, if r = 0, then k, ` are dependent in v and we
have, with S = S0,
HλSLk (N, v + α · uS,B)−HλSLk (N, v,B)
λS,{k}
=
(9)
Kλ,S(k)
λS,{k}
α
=
(7)
(8)
Kλ,S(`)
λS,{`}
α =
HλSL` (N, v + α · uS,B)−HλSL` (N, v,B)
λS,{`}
.
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Thus, we also have in the r-th level game, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
HλSLBr(k)(Br, (v + α · uS)r,Br)−HλSLBr(k)(Br, vr,Br)
λCrS , Bk
=
Lem. 8.1
Lem. 8.2
HλSLBr(`)(Br, (v + α · uS)r,Br)−HλSLBr(`)(Br, vr,Br)
λCrS , B`
and the claim follows by LG.
8.2.2 Proof of Theorem 5.5
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, λ ∈ ΛB, S ∈ ΩN, and ϕ be an LS-value which satisfies all
axioms of Theorem 5.5. Due to Proposition 5.4, property (2), and A, it is sufficient to show
that ϕ is uniquely defined on the game vS := ∆v(S) · uS.
By Lemma 8.1, for each level r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, exists exactly one coalition T rS , T rS ⊆ Br,
which is the smallest coalition of all Rr, Rr ⊇ S, with associated Rr ⊆ Br and so in each
game
(Br, vrS,Br) ∈ VLBr we have ∆vrS(T rS ) = ∆v(S) and ∆vrS(Rr) = 0 for Rr ⊆ Br, Rr 6=T rS . Therefore, by (3), possibly using Conv. 8.3, all components B ∈ Br, B ∩ S 6= ∅, are
dependent in vrS. If B ∈ Br, B ∩ S = ∅, we have, by N,
∑
i∈B ϕi(N, vS,B) = 0. Also due to
N, we get
ϕi(N,0 + ∆v(S) · uS,B)− ϕi(N,0,B) = ϕi(N, vS,B) for all i ∈ N. (15)
We use induction on the size m, 0 ≤ m ≤ h, for all levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, with m := h− r.
Initialization: Let m = 0 and so r = h. It follows for all i ∈ S with ∏h`=r λCrS (i),Br(i) > 0,
a such i always exists, and all B ∈ Br, B ∩ S 6= ∅,∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(15)
(CDDλ)
λCrS (i), B
λCrS (i),Br(i)
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B). (16)
⇒
∑
B∈Br,
B∩S 6=∅
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
∑
B∈Br,
B∩S 6=∅
λCrS (i), B
λCrS (i),Br(i)
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(E)
∆v(S)
⇒ ∑j∈Br(i) ϕj(N, vS,B) = ∏h`=r λC`S(i),B (`i)∆v(S). (17)
By (16), we have for all B ∈ Br, B ∩ S 6= ∅, with ∏h`=r λC`S(i), B = 0,∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
h∏
`=r
λC`S(i), B∆v(S). (18)
Induction step: Assume that (17) and (18) hold to ϕ with an arbitrary m−1, 0 ≤ m−1 ≤
h− 1 (IH). It follows for all i ∈ S with ∏h`=r λC`S(i),B (`i) > 0,∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(15)
(CDDλ)
∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
λCrS (i), B
λCrS (i),Br(i)
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B)
=
(IH)
h∏
`=r+1
λC`S(i),B (`i)∆v(S)
⇒
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
h∏
`=r
λC`S(i),B (`i)∆v(S)
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and, analogous to before, for all B ∈ Br, B ∩ S 6= ∅, with ∏h`=r λC`S(i), B = 0, we have
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
h∏
`=r
λC`S(i), B∆v(S).
Therefore, ϕ is uniquely defined on vS (take m = h and so r = 0).
8.2.3 Proof of Theorem 5.7
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN be fixed.
⇒: By Remark 5.3 and Proposition 5.4, each ϕ ∈ HSL on (N, v, B) ∈ VLN coincides
with a Harsanyi payoff φ ∈ H on (N, v) ∈ VN and satisfies LG.
⇐: By Remark 5.6, each φ ∈ H satisfies the TU-versions of E, N, A, and CDDPλ′
for some λ′ ∈ ΛN. Therefore, any LS-value ϕ that coincides with a Harsanyi payoff must
satisfy the simply transferred LS-versions of these axioms where we have, as in Remark
5.6, Kλ,T (i) = λ
′
T,i for each T ∈ ΩN and all i ∈ T . Note that CDDλ0 is implied by the
transferred LS-axiom of CDDPλ
′
, and CDDλ is implied, due to Remark 3.1, by CDDλ0
and LG. Thus, all the axioms of Theorem 5.5 must be satisfied and we have ϕ ∈ HSL.
8.2.4 Proof of Corollary 5.8
The claim follows immediately due to the axiomatization of the Harsanyi set (Vasil’ev,
1981) by the TU-versions of E, N, Po, and A and Theorem 5.7.
8.2.5 Proof of Proposition 6.3
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, w ∈ WB, and Krw,T be the expressions according to Def. 6.1.
By Remark 6.2, ShwSL coincides with HλSL where for each T r ∈ ΩN, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, we have for
all B ∈ Br, λCTr, B = wB. Thus, all axioms from Prop. 5.4 are satisfied (with appropriate
modification of any required sharing weights).
• SAMo: The claim follows immediately by (10).
• Dw: Let k, ` ∈ N, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, Br(`) ⊆ Br+1(k) and Br(k),Br(`) be dependent in vr on
the LS-game (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr. If r = 0, then k, ` are dependent in v and we get
ShwSLk (N, v,B)
w{k}
=
(10)
∑
T⊆N,T3k
Kw,T (k)
w{k}
∆v(T ) =
(3)
∑
T⊆N, {k,`}⊆T
Kw,T (k)
w{k}
∆v(T )
=
Def.
6.1
∑
T⊆N, {k,`}⊆T
Kw,T (`)
w{`}
∆v(T ) =
ShwSL` (N, v,B)
w{`}
.
Thus we have also in the r-th level game, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
ShwSLBr(k)(Br, vr,Br)
wBr(k)
=
ShwSLBr(`)(Br, vr,Br)
wBr(`)
and the claim follows by LG.
• MD: The claim follows immediately by Dw.
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8.2.6 Proof of Theorem 6.4
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, w ∈ WB, S ∈ ΩN, and ϕ be an LS-value that satisfies all
axioms of Theorem 6.4. Due to Proposition 6.3, property (2), and A, it is sufficient to show
that ϕ is uniquely defined on the game vS := ∆v(S) · uS.
By Lemma 8.1, for each level r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, exists exactly one coalition T rS , T rS ⊆ Br,
which is the smallest coalition of all Rr, Rr ⊇ S, with associated Rr ⊆ Br and so in each
game
(Br, vrS,Br) ∈ VLBr we have ∆vrS(T rS ) = ∆v(S) and ∆vrS(Rr) = 0 for Rr ⊆ Br, Rr 6=T rS . Therefore, by (3), possibly using Conv. 8.3, all components B ∈ Br, B ∩ S 6= ∅, are
dependent in vrS. If B ∈ Br, B ∩ S = ∅, we have, by N,
∑
i∈B ϕi(N, vS,B) = 0.
We use induction on the size m, 0 ≤ m ≤ h, for all levels r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, with m := h− r.
Initialization: Let m = 0 and so r = h. For an arbitrary i ∈ S, we get∑
B∈Bh,
B∩S 6=∅
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(Dw)
∑
B∈Bh,
B∩S 6=∅
wB
wBh(i)
∑
j∈Bh(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(E)
∆v(S)
⇒
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
h∏
k=h−m
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
∆v(S). (19)
Induction step: Assume that (19) holds to ϕ with an arbitrary m− 1, 0 ≤ m− 1 ≤ h− 1
(IH). It follows, for an arbitrary i ∈ S,∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
∑
j∈B
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
(Dw)
∑
B∈Br, B∩S 6=∅,
B⊆Br+1(i)
wB
wBr(i)
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B)
=
(IH)
h∏
k=h−m+1
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
∆v(S)
⇒
∑
j∈Br(i)
ϕj(N, vS,B) =
h∏
k=h−m
wBk(i)∑
B∈Bk:B⊆Bk+1(i),
B∩S 6=∅
wB
∆v(S).
Therefore, ϕ is uniquely defined on vS (take m = h and so r = 0).
8.2.7 Proof of Theorem 6.5
Let (N, v, B) ∈ VLN, B = Bh, w ∈ WB, and ϕ be an LS-value that satisfies all axioms of
Theorem 6.5. In Casajus and Huettner (2008), it is shown that CSE and M are equivalent
in TU-games. Obviously, their proof also applies to LS-games. This means that CSE is
satisfied as well. By Theorem 6.3, we have only to show that ϕ satisfies (10).
We use a first induction I1 on t := |{T ⊆ N : T is essential in v}|.
Initialization I1: Let t = 0, then for all games (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, vr is
identical to zero on all coalitions. So all players, possibly using Conv. 8.3, are dependent
in each game vr and for all Brk, B
r
` ∈ Br, Br` ⊆ Br+1(Brk), we have∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBrk
=
(Dw)
∑
i∈Br`
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBr`
.
We use a second induction I2 on the size m := h− r to show that we have∑
i∈Br
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all 0 ≤ r ≤ h and Br∈ Br. (20)
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Initialization I2: Let m = 0 and so r = h. We get for an arbitrary B
h
k ∈ Bh,∑
Bh∈Bh
∑
i∈Bh
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(Dw)
∑
Bh∈Bh
wBh
wBhk
∑
i∈Bhk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(E)
0.
It follows that
∑
i∈Bh ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all Bh ∈ Bh because we have wBh > 0 and Bhk is
arbitrary.
Induction step I2: Assume that (20) holds to ϕ if m ≥ 0 (IH2). We get for an arbitrary
Brk ∈ Br that ∑
Br∈Br,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
∑
i∈Br
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(Dw)
∑
Br∈Br,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
wBr
wBrk
∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(IH2)
0.
It follows,
∑
i∈Br ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all 0 ≤ r ≤ h and Br ∈ Br. Therefore, we have also
ϕi(N, v,B) = 0 for all i ∈ N and (10) is satisfied for ϕ if t = 0.
Induction step I1: Assume that (10) holds to ϕ if t ≥ 0, (IH1). Let exactly t+1 coalitions
Qk ⊆ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ t+ 1, be essential in v and denote
Q :=
⋂
1≤k≤t+1
Qk.
We distinguish two cases: (a) i ∈ N\Q and (b) i ∈ Q.
(a) Each player i ∈ N\Q is a member of at most t essential coalitions Qk and v has at
least one essential coalition Ti, i /∈ Ti. Hence, there exists a coalition function vi where all
coalitions have the same dividend in vi as in v, with the exception of coalition Ti, that gets
the dividend ∆vi(Ti) = 0, and there exists a scalar c ∈ R, c 6= 0, where
∆v(S) =
{
∆vi(Ti) + c, if S = Ti,
∆vi(S), else.
By CSE, we get ϕi(v) = ϕi(vi) with i ∈ N\Ti. Since there is such a Ti for all i ∈ N\Q, it
follows that ϕi(v) = ϕi(vi) for all i ∈ N\Q. All coalition functions vi get at most t essential
coalitions and, by (IH1), we have
ϕi(v) = Sh
wSL
i (N, v,B) for all i ∈ N\Q. (21)
(b) Each player j ∈ Q is a member of all t+ 1 essential coalitions Qk ⊆ N, 1 ≤ k ≤ t+ 1,
and therefore, by (3) and Conv. 8.3, all players j ∈ Q are dependent in v. We define for
each r, 0 ≤ r ≤ h, a set
BrQ := {Br∈ Br : Br∩Q 6= ∅}.
Note that all components Brk, B
r
` ∈ BrQ, Br` ⊆ Br+1(Brk), are dependent in vr. We use a third
induction I3 on the size s := h− r to show that we have∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Brk
ShwSLi (N, v,B) for all Brk ∈ BrQ. (22)
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Initialization I3: Let s = 0 and so r = h. We get for an arbitrary B
h
k ∈ BhQ∑
Bh∈BhQ
∑
i∈Bh
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(Dw)
∑
Bh∈BhQ
wBh
wBhk
∑
i∈Bhk
ϕi(N, v,B)
=
(E)
(21)
∑
Bh∈BhQ
∑
i∈Bh
ShwSLi (N, v,B) =
(Dw)
∑
Bh∈BhQ
wBh
wBhk
∑
i∈Bhk
ShwSLi (N, v,B)
⇒
∑
i∈Bhk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Bhk
ShwSLi (N, v,B).
Induction step I3: Assume that (22) holds to ϕ if s ≥ 0 (IH3). We get for an arbitrary
Brk ∈ BrQ and, because Br+1(Brk) ∈ Br+1Q ,∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
∑
i∈Br
ϕi(N, v,B) =
(Dw)
∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
wBr
wBrk
∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B)
=
(IH3)
(21)
∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
∑
i∈Br
ShwSLi (N, v,B) =
(Dw)
∑
Br∈BrQ,
Br⊆Br+1(Brk)
wBr
wBrk
∑
i∈Brk
ShwSL(N, v,B)
⇒
∑
i∈Brk
ϕi(N, v,B) =
∑
i∈Brk
ShwSLi (N, v,B).
Finally, we get ϕi(N, v,B) = ShwSLi (N, v,B) for all i ∈ Q.
8.2.8 Proof of Theorem 6.6
By Proposition 6.3, we only have to show the way back.
Let (N, v,B) ∈ VLN,B = Bh, and ϕ be an LS-value that satisfies E, N, SAMo, A, and
MD. By SAMo and N, we have ϕi(N, uN ,B) > 0 for all i ∈ N . Define a w ∈ WB by
wB :=
∑
i∈B ϕi(N, uN ,B) for all B ∈ B. By MD, we have for all Bk, B` ∈ Br, 0 ≤ r ≤ h,
such that B` ⊆ Br+1(Bk), and Bk, B` are dependent in (Br, vr,Br) ∈ VLBr ,∑
i∈Bk
ϕi(N, v,B)
wBk
=
∑
i∈B`
ϕi(N, v,B)
wB`
and Dw is satisfied. The claim follows by Theorem 6.4.
8.3 Logical independence
All axiomatizations must also be valid for B = B0. In this case, the axioms used in this
article for axiomatization coincide with axioms for TU-values. These axiomatizations thus
correspond in this context to axiomatizations of the Harsanyi payoffs and weighted Shapley
values respectively. It is well-known or easy to prove that the axioms there are logically
independent. Therefore, all axioms for LS-values in the given axiomatizations must also be
logically independent.
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